Spreading the thriving

Jan Eeckhout’s The Profit Paradox: how thriving firms threaten the future of work is a very good read. It’s a game of two halves (yes, someone in my household is permanently watching the football at the moment).

The first half (in fact parts 1 and 2) is a nice synopsis of the reasons the economy (mainly the US but others are covered) tend towards a) concentration across many markets and hence b) diverging fortunes of companies and their employees, and the places where people live. This covers the features of digital technology, superstar phenomena, agglomeration economies – these are familiar to anyone who has been keeping up with the literature, but I applaud how well the book is written. Hooray for an economist who can write so engagingly. This section documents the evidence on concentration and mark-ups, the growing divergence between companies in terms of productivity and profits, and the corresponding decline in the labour share as outsourcing of routine occupations (call centres, cleaners, admin) has progressed. Eeckhout argues that there is assortative matching such that pay and conditions are polarising between people with high value jobs in frontier firms and people with low value added jobs in their contractors.

The book’s focus is on the implications of market power for people as workers, rather than as consumers – although it also notes the excess pricing power too. In sum, it reduces wages, both directly through monopsony power in individual labour markets and also because of the the macroeconomic consequences: with so many people in contingent work with low pay, aggregate demand is inadequate. (Some) firms are doing well but the economy isn’t. And this is the heart of Eeckhout’s argument: “The effect of the tide of market power is lowering wages across the economy.” I find this link persuasive. While there are many economists looking at the elements of this story, the way they are combined here is enlightening.

The second half turns to the much harder question of what to do, starting with an affirmation that for all the disruption the new technologies are a good thing (this chunk reminded me a bit of my own Paradoxes of Prosperity, which first came out in September 2001 and not surprisingly was hardly noticed).

The recommendations boil down to: enforce labour standards; mandate more data openness; and beef up anti-trust policies. In particular (under the last heading) stop big tech making more acquisitions, regulate them rather than break them up (so as not to lose beneficial network economies), and assess market impacts in the round rather than firm by firm. (Tricky to implement but I do remember that in my days on the Competition Commission, as it then was, we often had to include a section of the report on ‘Features of the market’ – problems in concentrated markets do often spread beyond an individual transaction).

I’d agree with all these suggestions in the book but they add up to a meta-suggestion: find the political will to change the institutional architecture so that it delivers fairer outcomes. The technological tides won’t retreat but the effects depend on what institutions confront them. Is Lina Khan’s appointment in the US a sign of lasting change?

 

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Why is there no government chief anthropologist?

Almost a decade ago I gave a lecture which opened with this question. I was probing the influence of economists in government, for good or ill. (This discussion is picked up in my forthcoming book, Cogs and Monsters.) Perhaps I’d been influenced more than I realised by having been on the economics reporting beat with Gillian Tett in the 1990s, she for the FT and me for The Independent. We were all very impressed by her PhD in anthropology, as fieldwork in Tajikistan seemed very exciting and adventurous.

Gillian’s new book, Anthro Vision: How Anthropology Can Explain Business and Life, starts with that fieldwork, including the less thrilling part about being trapped in a hotel room as civil war raged outside. It’s a rattling good read, as one would expect from a top journalist. The book is divided into what she describes as the core principles of anthropology: the need to make the strange familiar, to make the familiar strange and to listen to what is not said. These add up to an effort to develop some objectivity about the group or society under investigation – I was struck for example, by the parallel with the outsiders who foresaw the financial crisis in Michael Lewis’s The Big Short. Gillian’s reputation was totally confirmed by her early warnings about impending crisis.

At the same time, the methods of anthropology, especially ethnography or participant observation, bring the researcher close to the objects of study. The book is adamant that use of data and computers alone fails to deliver important insights. I couldn’t agree more, both in terms of determining economic policy and in terms of research. I love applied economics but one of the joys of my work now is working in interdisciplinary teams using different methods.

The book has loads of interesting vignettes about the use of anthropology, particularly in business, where there seems to be more of it than I had realised. Some that particularly struck me: teenagers seem addicted to their mobile phones because that is the only space left where they are free to roam and hang out, now that their lives are so constrained in the physical world. As Gillian points out, when we were young we wandered around by ourselves, met friends, drifted around the shops. For various reasons, all of these spaces have closed to today’s adolescents.

Another is the account of the engineers of the Internet Engineering Task Force, which oversees technical management of the internet, voting on changes to rules and protocols by – humming. Votes are taken by which group hums the loudest. Lockdown has made decision-making most unsatisfactory.

So to return to my starting point, it seems to me that a Government Chief Anthropologist would be a good innovation. And they should sit in an office with the Government Chief Economist.

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Public policy & public interest

I enjoyed another short book I opted for this holiday weekend, Power to the Public: The promise of public interest technology by Tara Dawson McGuinness and Hana Schank. It’s about the process of making policy and implementing it, rather than the analysis, and that’s one of the key points: that delivery of outcomes is integrated with the design of policies and the data on which analysis is based. The three ‘Ds’ are all essential, and linked to each other. I was interested in this book because we also published one (Digital Transformation at Scale) on the UK (the focus here is the US) about the digital delivery of public services, by Public Digital, the team that originally set up the Government Digital Service.

There are some clear lessons from the experiences on both sides of the Atlantic. One is that talking to the service users and administrators is essential because they contribute information about outcomes and barriers that is otherwise unknowable. Another is that thinking about the data that is not there is as important as the data that’s available, and this is why diversity of experience is important in public service delivery – a somewhat broader point than data bias. A third lesson is that the project of digitising services opens the door to changing processes and even policies – it is not just a matter or replicating paper processes online. Automating a bad policy is not a good outcome. A fourth lesson is the way the decision to digitise helps to bring about policy co-ordination that never happens at the level of policy analysis, for delivery is impossible without tackling all the obstacles to success. This means – fifth lesson – that it can be difficult and slow, and requires building coalitions of support.

The book has lots of examples and convinced me. The rapidly-growing ‘govtech’ or public interest tech movement is encouraging – for instance the US has Code for America and now New America, which these authors lead, and the UK has Public Digital, and State Up. One advantage the US has over the UK is the federal system, meaning different states can provide many opportunities to reform, and natural experiments. As McGuinness and Schank note, successful projects do require consistent political support right from the top. Let’s hope that the imperatives of having to deliver better outcomes for political reasons and needing to restore some order to the public finances during the recovery will mean that support is there.

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Humanomics – yes please

After a 700+ page tome, excellent as it was, I went next for Deirdre McCloskey’s 100 page Bettering Humanomics: A New, and Old, Approach to Economic Science. Her style is something of an acquired taste – I like it, but know some don’t. In any case, there is no doubting the extraordinary breadth and depth of her knowledge (which was on full display in her Bourgeois Virtues trilogy).

This essay is an update on a constant theme through McCloskey’s work, which is the need for a broader methodological approach to economics by economists. The discipline is hobbled by a narrow range of methods, an obsession with one particular style of showy reasoning (often powerful, but often tipping over into ‘mathiness‘ or the cult of statistical significance. Nick Crafts refers to the ‘identification police’, a character everybody who has had a paper rejected by Reviewer 2 because he doesn’t think causality has been demonstrated in the approved way will recognise. The methodological constraints are reinforced by the tyranny of the Top 5 and the insider process for selection that characterises them.

Anyway, I was predisposed to agree with McCloskey in Bettering Humanomics. Her main theme is that ideas and language shape the economy, and economics needs to listen. As she points out, rhetoric has often changed things on the ground in dramatic and sudden ways – we are not deterministic products of centuries of culture. Economies can turn around in short periods – think post-war Germany, Ireland and Portugal, or Thailand and South Korea. Such changes – and many other examples from the impact of advertising to same-sex marriage – torpedo a “notion of preknown preferences derived from utilitarian theory of decision without rhetorical reflection.” The implication is that the kind of arguments about economic development popular among economists based on game theory or some other theoretical structure explain too much: they are too universalist, and ignore the way our actions at any moment are shaped by the expectations of others and the contextual specifics. I cover similar ground in my next book, Cogs and Monsters (out October 12th!).

So, I liked Bettering Humanomics. It’s critical of economics but a critique by someone who knows what she’s talking about and loves the analytical and empirical power of the subject. I think economics is changing, re-embracing the work of economists such as Hirschman and Baumol and Veblen – I hope so. 51jI00dx7mL._SX331_BO1,204,203,200_

 

The history – and future – of American capitalism

Reading Jonathan Levy’s Ages of American Capitalism: A History of the United States has been quite a commitment: over 700 pages of text, plus notes, in hardback. The sheer weight militated against my taking in the grand sweep if its ambition, as I had to read it sitting at home propped on cushions. Nevertheless, it was well worth it.

As the title suggests, the account is organised into different ages: commerce (early days from late 17th century, and the role of slavery); capital (post Civil War to Fordism and the Depression); control (New Deal & postwar golden age); chaos (1980 on). The organising idea is the changed relationship between state and business in each of the eras, but importantly that the state, and political decisions, always ultimately determined the character of capitalism. The private sector – titans such as Morgan and Ford – clearly made a massive contribution to shaping US industrialisation through their business model choices, union-bashing and personal force of will; but they were not writing the story of capitalism on a blank sheet of paper. Government decisions and political forces constrained them and tamed them. And in each of the eras, there were distinct political visions, starting with the conflicting Hamilton and Jefferson visions.

This political economy framing made the final section the most interesting to me, given the many straws in the wind indicating that the 2020s will prove another junction between eras as belief in the “Magic of the Market” (Chapter 19) evaporates. This isn’t to say the Biden presidency will form the template for a new era – and indeed the book stops with the post-GFC recession – but rather that the Reaganite/Thatcherite order has become a disorder.

As in any Big Book, there are lots of interesting details and eye-catching turns of phrase. The superior logistics of the Union Army for example, involving vast military contracts for provisions and even railroad-building: “A highly functional political economy of corruption helped the Union win the war.” The early signs of the importance of the changing geography in US economic development as NASA and companies such as IBM opened facilities in Alabama in the late 1950s, signalling the rise of the sunbelt. The role of JP Morgan in creating forward-looking corporate valuations in the late 19th century merger movement.

There are points at which it seems like the book isn’t 100% in control of the economic terminology. For instance, Levy frequently uses a phrase about deposits ‘pyramiding into New York’ as if it’s a technical term of art. And there are a few scattered graphs that don’t add much to the words – the reproduced paintings are better illustrations of the points being made, be it about the frontier or 1960s consumerism. These are minor quibbles.

The book ends: “I have emphasized that American capitalism is an especially forward-looking economic system, in which expectations of the future play a prominent role in determining the present.” I think this statement is always true, and that it’s the balance between optimism about the future and nostalgia for the past that shapes an economy. The same page later lights on what is particularly distinctive about the US: “its pronounced historical amnesia.” And as Levy concludes, now is the moment for a better imagined future to come into play. Over to the politicians, Biden and the not-yet dormant spectre of Trumpism.

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