Populism, technocracy and politics

It’s possible to feel gloomy about the prospects for democracy, even with Joe Biden safely in the White House and a few regional or local elections that have gone against the extreme right, in Germany and France. The current UK government, for example, gives rather alarmingly frequent Trumpist signs of wanting to tear down some of the protections for the institutions of democracy (IDs to vote when there is next to no voter fraud, rigging public appointments, attacking independent institutions). So Jan-Werner Müller’s Democracy Rules is timely. As he puts it: “Farage did not bring Brexit about all by himself: he needed his Michael Gove… and his Boris Johnson.” Populism is an elitist game; on both sides of the Atlantic established conservative elites are at the heart of the trend. It is also anti-democratic, including in defining some groups (immigrants, asylum seekers, minorities) as outsiders by their nature.

The first chapter sets the scene by diagnosing recent political trends. The middle section of the book discusses the necessary conditions for democracy. One thing that very much struck me is that uncertainty is inherent in democracy. “On a very basic level democracy makes no sense without the possibility of people at least sometimes changing their minds.” Identity, of any kind, “is not political destiny.” Opinion polls do not reveal eternal truths. Politics is not a matter of fixing problems. “The point is that claims about conflicts in a society can be presented in different ways and there is a creative element in how major political choices are put together and offered to voters.” The institutions of democracy need to embed uncertainty – and so, for example, Müller argues that the domain of algorithmic decision making in policy needs to be curtailed.

This section ends with an interesting discussion of the relationship between technocracy and populism: techno-populism. The argument is that the will of the ‘ordinary’ person is proclaimed while at the same time technocrats are charged with implementing the ‘will of the people’ in the interests of the common good – Italy’s 5 Star movement is the example. “Technocracy and populism are both anti-pluralist or even anti-political, if one takes politics to mean that the solutions are never just given by either expertise or the fiction of a uniform popular will.”

The book ends by emphasizing the importance of intermediary institutions: parties and the media – which are of course the targets populists go for, parasitically hollowing out their host party, gerrymandering, attacking electoral watchdogs, undermining independent journalism. There is a coda offering reasons for “hope but not optimism.” As with some other excellent recent books about the assault on democracy (eg this or this), I ended up feeling rather glum, but agreed very much with the closing shot: democracy is not about hope but rather about effort.

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Philosophy for humans (and Humeans)

I’ve thoroughly enjoyed Julian Baggini’s The Great Guide: What David Hume Can Teach Us about Being Human and Living Well. It took me back in a Proustian way to the late 1970s, when I was reading Hume in my PPE course and struggling with the ideas-impressions discussion while relishing his essay on the price-specie flow mechanism. But then I was always much better at the E than either of the Ps. And despite my struggles with philosophy, I’ve always been a Hume fan. The pragmatism, empiricism, moderation all appealed. Of course, Hume like so many of our forebears held views we see as unacceptable – the book discusses them in an early chapter. But I hold to my generally high opinion of him, feeling we could share a motto: Well, it’s a bit more complicated than that.

The Great Guide takes a chronological approach through Hume’s life, using the pleasing device of visiting the places he lived and including photos by the author. The key ideas are pegged to different chapters as Hume published his books and essays. There’s an excellent discussion of induction, and the role of experience as opposed to a priori reasoning in understanding causality. As Baggini summarises, it logic is algorithmic but, “There is no algorithm for good reaosning.” There is also an interesting section on the social character of reasoning: reasoning needs not to be something that inheres in us as individuals. “Although there is a sense in which we have to be the ultimate judge of what seems most rational to us, in order to reach such a judgement we have to argue with others and hear conrtdictory viewpoints.”

I also liked the discussion of Hume’s idea of personal identity as an aggregate of feelings, perceptions, ideas etc, which Baggini tells me is close to the Buddhist concept of anatta. And thoroughly agree with him that, “Hume shows us that the best writing combines rigor of thought with clarity of expression, difficulty of substance with ease of style.”

Maxims like these are dotted through the book and collected at the end, to live up to the promise of the subtitle. They reinforce Hume’s position as my favourite philosopher.

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