The Enlightened Economist Prize, 2012

It’s a month since I posted the shortlist for this entirely personal prize for the best economics book I’ve read in the previous 12 months. So the time has come to announce the winner. It has been a difficult choice – I was about to write that getting it down to a final four was relatively straightforward, but then I started arguing with myself about the titles I’d eliminated. Anyway, on the criteria of (a) contains serious economic argument, (b) accessible to a wider readership than professional economists, (c) I thoroughly enjoyed reading it, the winner is:

[amazon_link id=”1906924775″ target=”_blank” ]Economic Fables[/amazon_link] by Ariel Rubinstein

[amazon_image id=”1906924775″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Economic Fables[/amazon_image]

The prize is mainly the honour, of course – unlike the FT’s book prize, I don’t have the financial heft of Goldman Sachs backing this. However, I will be delighted to take Ariel and his publisher out for a celebratory meal if we can arrange all to be in the same city some time.

Fast or slow, rich or poor?

As part of my thinking about a book I’m currently working on, I started to re-read a book by Jonathan Gershuny, [amazon_link id=”019926189X” target=”_blank” ]Changing Times: Work and Leisure in Post-Industrial Society[/amazon_link] (2000). He has led the way in work on time-use studies, as well as some key longitudinal data sets. It’s the first time I’ve read this book since it was published, and I’d forgotten how interesting it is. As he points out, “Change in time use patterns is not a mere indicator of social change; it is itself part of the essence of socio-economic development. A ‘poor’ society is one which must devote the bulk of its time to low value-added activities which go to satisfy basic wants or needs.” Low value added activities are those where the ratio of paid work per minute of consumption time is low – many hours are needed to deliver the consumption experience.

[amazon_image id=”019926189X” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Changing Times: Work and Leisure in Postindustrial Society[/amazon_image]

All eras of technological progress have brought complaints about things speeding up and being short of time. I was reflecting on how the recent ‘[amazon_link id=”0847829456″ target=”_blank” ]slow food[/amazon_link]’ movement fits into Gershuny’s framework. It seems to be a regression in economic development yet its advocates see ‘slow’ as the most sustainable future for the economy. They are also quite likely to be high- rather than low-income members of the community (as are the buyers of organic foods). Maybe these slow fooders are sufficiently affluent that their time spent providing for the basic need of eating is effectively leisure rather than work, a hobby not a necessity. Anyway, I shall carry on reading and see if I’m further enlightened on this question.

[amazon_image id=”0847829456″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Slow Food Nation: Why Our Food Should Be Good, Clean, and Fair[/amazon_image]

What’s The Use of Economics?

Today – the fourth anniversary of the Lehman’s collapse and the fifth of the run on Northern Rock – is the official publication date of [amazon_link id=”1907994041″ target=”_blank” ]What’s The Use of Economics? Teaching the Dismal Science after the Crisis.[/amazon_link] The idea behind the conference and essays was to get a start on reforming economics by going straight to the way future generations of economists are taught.

There are lots of good contributions in the book, including from Andrew Lo, Andy Haldane, John Kay, Alan Kirman, Bridget Osborne, Paul Seabright, Ben Friedman…. (I wrote the intro). There are links to reviews and also a comment I wrote in Research Fortnight on the book’s web page. The common underlying theme from a wide range of contributors (based in the US, UK and France) is that the crisis will not and cannot leave economics itself unchanged – although there are obviously quite a few economists, especially in the academic world, still heavily in denial about this.

[amazon_image id=”1907994041″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]What’s the Use of Economics?: Teaching the Dismal Science After the Crisis[/amazon_image]

If readers of this blog do read the book, I would love to get feedback, and suggestions for next steps, as we have a working group aiming to report next year.

How to become a master of the universe

Surely one firm prediction we can make about the aftermath of the financial crisis is that the idea of the unimprovability of free market outcomes has been thoroughly overturned. Neoliberalism (meaning the political movement which brought about deregulatory, market-based policies)  is, like Shelley’s Ozymandias, a “colossal wreck, boundless and bare”. From this perspective, a new book by Daniel Stedman Jones, [amazon_link id=”0691151571″ target=”_blank” ]Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics[/amazon_link], is a fascinating study in how a political philosophy that now looks so wrong headed came to be so absolutely dominant in the first place.

It is a tale of building up the intellectual story, creating the personal alliances and the political organisation to deliver the project. This took place over many decades, from the post-war publication of key texts such as Hayek’s [amazon_link id=”0415253896″ target=”_blank” ]The Road to Serfdom[/amazon_link] and Popper’s [amazon_link id=”0415610214″ target=”_blank” ]The Open Society and Its Enemies[/amazon_link], through the impact of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School on economics, the work of free market think tanks on both sides of the Atlantic and ultimately, the governments of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. It is an extraordinary success given the collectivist flavour of the public mood after the Great Depression and World War 2.

Of course, the Cold War helped the neoliberal cause. The key turning point in its success, however, came in the 1970s, thanks to the economic collapse, which made it clear the post-war Keynesian demand management approach had stopped working. The ostentatious abuse of economic power by some elements in the unions contributed as well to the readiness for an economic and political alternative. By the late 1970s, the centre of gravity of political thinking had already moved far towards the neoliberal position – the emphasis on sound macroeconomic fundamentals and union reform had become uncontroversial, thanks to events. After Reagan and Thatcher, the fundamentals of market-thinking were so embedded that all their successors – until this crisis at least – were unable to think outside that framework; Stedman Jones sees Clinton and Blair as holding the same philosophy, and many people would surely agree.

Stedman Jones sums up: “The market as neoliberalism matured was presented as clear common sense, whose basic logic was inescapable. Of course, this presentation was fantasy. Some markets succeeded and others failed. The ideological case for the superiority of the market in all areas of economic and social life amounted to a political faith as utopian as any other. … The most striking thing … is how much of [Hayek’s] pure ideological vision did come to pass in Britain and the United States after 1980.” (p82)

I should add that he is carefully unjudgemental about the ideology – the book aims to describe how it came about rather than pass a verdict on it, and is all the more illuminating for that. There are clearly some attractive aspects to the creed. Who could argue with macroeconomic stability (if only we could be sure how to achieve it)? And there is an attractive cosmopolitanism about neoliberalsim too, which the book traces to its origins in pre-war Vienna.

Still, I suspect that the next decade will see a big shift in the mental landscape, the spirit of the age, and many people will echo the question: how did this marketised perspective become so utterly dominant? For its legacy is the crisis and its aftermath. The answer I took from the book is that ideas do matter, but they do not trump the importance of good old fashioned organisation. Those who want a different view to prevail need to talk about it – and set about delivering it.

[amazon_image id=”0691151571″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics[/amazon_image]

Banks behaving badly

It’s five years since Northern Rock hit the rocks, and four years since Lehman Brothers went bust. The banking system remains fragile, a number of Eurozone banks still posing a threat of global systemic instability. Regulatory reform creeps ahead, slowly, very slowly, and (as Andy Haldane pointed out in his paper The Dog and The Frisbee) will not work anyway. In other words, after half a decade the financial crisis is still in full swing. We are all paying for it in direct taxpayer subventions, through the central banks massively subsidising banks’ costs, and through slow growth – the latest US figures showing real median incomes at their lowest since 1995 – 1995! –  illustrate the point starkly.

So I was shocked an angry to read a small article in the second section of the FT this morning (Banks Force Aluminium Market Shake-Up) pointing out that big investment banks have started speculating in aluminium. At a time of slow global growth, metals prices should be falling. Instead, there has been a 50% increase this year in aluminium because Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and the like are buying up large stocks and warehousing them to restrict supply.

“The increasingly dominant role of banks including Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and Deutsche Bank – as well as traders such as Glencore – has prompted a surge to record levels in the premium consumers pay for metal over the benchmark price set at the London Metal Exchange.”

This comes on the back of evidence that investment bank speculation on food commodities through new indices (launched by Goldmans) made a significant contribution to the increases in food prices in recent years.

Is anybody else angered by this? And why are politicians and regulators as silent on this front as they have been until very recently on the use of the financial system for tax avoidance and money laundering? A number of books have flagged up these behaviours in banking – Nicholas Shaxson’s [amazon_link id=”0099541726″ target=”_blank” ]Treasure Islands[/amazon_link], Misha Glenny’s [amazon_link id=”0099481251″ target=”_blank” ]McMafia[/amazon_link] and [amazon_link id=”0099546558″ target=”_blank” ]Dark Market[/amazon_link], Matt Taibbi’s early ‘vampire squid’ intervention in [amazon_link id=”0385529961″ target=”_blank” ]Griftopia[/amazon_link] – and other journalists have been covering the dark side of banking. But there is no salience for these issues in policy and political circles. Why aren’t central banks concerned about soaring commodity inflation when the economy is flat, and the deliberate market distortions causing it?

[amazon_image id=”0099546558″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]DarkMarket: How Hackers Became the New Mafia[/amazon_image]