realeconomik and realism

I’ve finished reading Grigory Yavlinsky’s [amazon_link id=”0300159102″ target=”_blank” ]realekonomik: The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (And How to Avert the Next One)[/amazon_link]. This was a prelude to discussing with him and with Michael Sandel (whose new book is [amazon_link id=”184614471X” target=”_blank” ]What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets[/amazon_link]) the issue of markets and morality on BBC Radio 4’s Start the Week.

Yavlinsky’s argument is one that will strike a chord with many people, post-Crash, namely that the main problem is that the financial markets in particular, but markets in general, are not so much amoral as immoral. He has good reason to be pessimistic about markets given his experience with Russia’s transition away from a planned economy – Yavlinsky’s own ‘500 Days’ plan was usurped by ‘shock therapy’ and the disorderly privatizations that accompanied it. He has since seen the rise of Russia’s oligarchs at the expense of living standards and even life expectancy for the great majority of ordinary people. It is not surprising that he sees parallels between that oligarchy and the western financial services oligarchy. realeconomik (the title is of course a play on realpolitik) has an excellent chapter on Russia, and is also convincing on the way structures such as intellectual property rights make it hard for developing countries to benefit from globalisation. Although I think it essential for this group of countries to participate in global production chains, it has always been clear that the TRIPS is a dreadful regime.

Yavlinksy concludes, pessimistically, in this book, that nothing has changed in the power of the financial oligarchs since the Crash: “Calls have gone unheard for a far-reaching change in moral attitudes and for deep and meaningful reform of modern capitalism.”

He’s right. It is pretty clear to me that the financial elite became disconnected from any normal notion of appropriate moral behaviour at some stage during the 90s or noughties, and are still on the whole inhabiting a different moral universe from the rest of us. That will have to change, although – despite the subtitle – Yavlinsky does not offer much guidance on how to bring about that change.

However, I differ from both him and Sandel in thinking the issue is more one of social norms than ‘markets’ in the abstract – because markets are not abstract, they are themselves a form of institution embedded in society and can operate in either moral or immoral ways. Indeed, you have to get beyond inveighing in general, abstract terms about ‘markets’ to be able to come up with specific proposals for change. It will take realism to overcome realeconomik.

I reviewed Sandel’s book recently for The Independent. My Tanner Lectures on these issues will be available shortly on the Brasenose College website.

[amazon_image id=”0300159102″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Realeconomik: The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (and How to Avert the Next One)[/amazon_image]

Teaching economists to communicate

I’m mid-way through editing some essays about how the way economics is taught in universities needs to change  – they will be out in September. The essays are a follow up to the conference (pdf) held at the Bank of England earlier this year, and there is also a working group looking at what practical steps are required in the UK. Anyway, one of the themes is the need for economics graduates to have the skill of communication to non-specialists, as there are no jobs outside the academic world that do not feature that as a central task.

The communication theme has also been on my mind as I prepare to give the Tanner Lectures (pdf) in Oxford on May 18th and 19th. The title is ‘The Public Responsibilities of the Economist’ and I’m finding that – as always – I need to explain that most economists do not do what everyone else thinks. People think economists go on the news/Twitter and pronounce confidently (albeit differently) about growth, austerity, the Euro etc, whereas although macroeconomics is an important function, most working economists are herbivores who spend their days looking at specific markets.

One of my conclusions is that economists need to take far more seriously the responsibility to communicate their subject – we are slow to do so, compared to scientists. As it happened, a column by Michael Burda about the Euro zone sent me today to David Hume’s [amazon_link id=”0865970564″ target=”_blank” ]Essays Moral, Political and Literary[/amazon_link] (online here). In his essay On Essay Writing, he divides people into two categories, the learned and the conversible – academics and the chattering classes. And he says:

“‘Tis with great Pleasure I observe, That Men of Letters, in this Age, have lost, in a great Measure, that Shyness and Bashfulness of Temper, which kept them at a Distance from Mankind; and, at the same Time, That Men of the World are proud of borrowing from Books their most agreeable Topics of Conversation. ‘Tis to be hop’d, that this League betwixt the learned and conversible Worlds, which is so happily begun, will be still farther improv’d to their mutual Advantage; and to that End, I know nothing more advantageous than such Essays as these with which I endeavour to entertain the Public. In this View, I cannot but consider myself as a Kind of Resident or Ambassador from the Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation; and shall think it my constant Duty to promote a good Correspondence betwixt these two States, which have so great a Dependence on each other. I shall give Intelligence to the Learned of whatever passes in Company, and shall endeavour to import into Company whatever Commodities I find in my native Country proper for their Use and Entertainment.”

[amazon_image id=”0865970564″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Essays – Moral, Political and Literary[/amazon_image]

Oh dear, this time *is* different – it’s much worse

The Euro crisis has re-entered a phase which makes turning on the news slightly nerve-wracking – and I’m not even a policy maker. So I turned off the radio and picked up once again that indispensable reference book, [amazon_link id=”0691152640″ target=”_blank” ]This Time Is Different[/amazon_link] by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. Their argument of course is that every time during the past eight centuries an economy has been in a financial bubble, people have deluded themselves that it will all end well this time.

Looking at their conclusions on managing out of a debt crisis, however, it’s hard to escape the sinking feeling that the scale of the challenge this time around *is* absolutely unprecedented. They note:

1. It is vital to have a full picture of all government indebtedness, not just external, and include the contingent liabilities such as future pensions. (Has anybody done this for Spain or Italy with their rapidly ageing and shrinking populations?)

2. We must remember that very, very few economies grow their way out of a debt crisis, and the realisation that this hope is delusional often brings about a sudden halt to all capital inflows.

3. “Many governments have succumbed to the temptation to inflate away domestic debt.”

4. Banking crises are protracted.

I’m not a macroeconomist, and have been watching the tennis match between pro-stimulus and pro-austerity macro people with the same bemusement as the general population. So although I appreciate that very eminent economists insist there is no danger of inflation given the current weakness of growth, and that it is naive to say QE will result in inflation, I’m still going to turn my thoughts to index-linked and real assets when it comes to pension planning. I suspect I’ll be competing with all those Greeks, Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese looking to park their savings outside their own economies.

[amazon_image id=”0691152640″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly[/amazon_image]

An amazing Kenyan innovation

It takes me quite a bit of effort to start reading an e-book, but yesterday I read [amazon_link id=”B007FPP7NI” target=”_blank” ]Money, Real Quick[/amazon_link] by Tonny Omwansa and Nicholas Sullivan, and  am very glad I overcame my reluctance. It’s a great overview of the M-PESA phenomenon. It sets out very clearly the reasons the mobile transactions scheme has been such a phenomenal success, the kind of amazing effects it is having on Kenya and the other countries where it’s now been launched, and also the challenges facing the service as it grows. I highly recommend this for anyone interested in either the specifics of mobile transactions or broader issues of economic development.

As the book says, “E-money is flying around the country, over the heads of lions and elephants.” Kenya, like other low income countries, is a cash-based economy. This presents special problems for poor people. They are highly vulnerable to theft, can’t save easily – banks and ATMs are few in number and too expensive for small transactions. There are problems I’d never thought of – rats eating notes stashed under a mattress; the temptation of bars passed on the way home with a bit of cash in hand. M-PESA has changed all that. It had 8 million subscribers by the end of 2009 and 15 million – nearly 70% of the adult population – by the start of 2012. Although 60% of Kenya’s electronic transactions are through M-PESA, they account for only 2.5% of the total value, and the balance in all M-PESA accounts combined is just 0.2% of total bank deposits. The system generates millions of very small transactions. It is, as the book says, “A financial tool for the masses.”

This is amazing. Exclusion from formal financial services is one of the barriers keeping people in poverty – they can’t save, can’t keep money securely, have to spend a lot of time and risk a lot of money in making transactions. (See one of the best books on this, [amazon_link id=”0691148198″ target=”_blank” ]Portfolios of the Poor.[/amazon_link]) The authors of Money, Real Quick write: “Maybe the formal financial sector will never provide what the poor need; maybe they will craft their own quasi-formal, technology-based, shadow banking system.”

The book describes some of the effects of M-PESA in expanding people’s opportunities. There is a living to be made as an agent for the scheme. Small businesses are able to develop a financial track record that qualifies them for loans or working capital. Farmers can pay into a savings scheme to acquire specific types of irrigation equipment. There is even a scheme allowing people in Kibera, the notorious slum, to invest in the stock market via a mutual fund. There is an M-PESA based pension scheme. It is hard to be sure how far the effects of M-PESA reach, but the book suggests they go quite a long way to explaining the economy’s recent success and the burst of innovation and entrepreneurship around Nairobi and other cities.

There are some challenges. The banks were, unsurprisingly, alarmed although the Kenyan authorities seem to have responded to their lobbying with a robust evidence-based assessment, and dismissed the claim that M-PESA had an unfair advantage. But its operator, Safaricom, has a very high market share and there are competition issues – other entrants are now active in the market. This includes other big multinationals. A deeper challenge is the question of what will move low income countries beyond cash – and whether m-transactions schemes can work as well in other countries.

I worked on a report on mobile transactions in general commissioned by Vodafone at the time of M-PESA’s commercial launch, The Transformational Potential of M-Transactions – it can be downloaded here (scroll all the way down to Paper number 6) and I think is still a good overview of the challenges and potential. Dave Birch of Consult Hyperion was involved in the early days too. Money, real quick, is another area of mobile where an important business model innovation has come from Africa (the first and most important was the idea of pre-paid cards). Kenya is way ahead of the UK and US here. The story is an amazing one, well worth reading if you don’t know it.

[amazon_image id=”B007FPP7NI” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Money, Real Quick: The story of M-PESA (Guardian Shorts)[/amazon_image]

Who is responsible for the Greek debt crisis?

The headlines are full of Greek politics – will the country opt out of the austerity/bailout/Euro package or not? It seems the rest of the Eurozone is presenting the issue as an ultimatum.

It set me to wondering why there hasn’t been more discussion about exactly what the terms of the bailout cover, and why. Because it was a shock to learn – via Paul Seabright’s recent Princeton in Europe lecture – that by 2008 Greece had become the world’s fifth biggest arms importer (pdf), and the second and third biggest customer for German and French arms exporters respectively, presumably in deals financed by German and French banks. Even in 2011, Greece’s defence spending amounted to 3.2% of GDP, the highest in Europe as a share of GDP,  and $1230 per Greek citizen.

(Parochial note – the UK is the world’s 5th biggest arms exporter, Europe’s 3rd behind France and Germany, and our biggest customers by 2008 were the US, India and Chile.)

Stopping the purchases would make a handy dent in the 9% of GDP budget deficit. So surely would ending interest payments – even defaulting – on those loans that financed the earlier arms build-up. If German and French banks were encouraged to extend them by their governments for geopolitical reasons, then those governments should take responsibility and face their own taxpayers, rather than placing the whole burden on Greek taxpayers.

This obviously isn’t the whole story. After all, not that many Greeks are taxpayers (only just over half, it seems), so there is definitely a need for Greece to face up to its own responsibilities too. But I find it odd that the story about Greece’s astonishing military build-up isn’t better known. All I could find is one Guardian article that mentioned it.

The data source is the highly-regarded [amazon_link id=”0199695520″ target=”_blank” ]SIPRI Yearbook[/amazon_link]. This is one of the shadowy areas of the global economy that economists don’t discuss enough, along with the outright illegal economy – as I touched on at the weekend with a little rant about the vampire cephalopods of the global economy.

[amazon_image id=”0199695520″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (SIPRI Yearbook Series)[/amazon_image]