A re-set proposal for the Euro

It seems a bold mission, to propose a solution to the Euro crisis in 80 pages. All the more so when the authors of The Euro in Danger: Reform and Reset, Jagjit Chadha, Michael Dempster and Derry Pickford, compare the present situation in Euroland with Lord Palmerston’s verdict on another European crisis: “Only three people…have ever really understood the Schleswig-Holstein business – the Prince Consort, who is dead; a German professor, who has gone mad; and I, who have forgotten all about it.”

This short book or long pamphlet also acknowledges that, as in the old joke, if you wanted to get to a sustainable Eurozone currency union, you wouldn’t be starting from here. It has some extraordinary charts, including one recording the movement of Target 2 balances, another showing the movement of unit labour costs – the message of every one of them is a story of dramatic divergence between the core and the periphery since 2009.

Nevertheless, the authors argue that the Euro should be saved, and they have some proposals for doing so. Their suggestion is what they describe as the ‘reset’ option: the peripheral countries should be allowed out temporarily in order to return as members when certain conditions, including those elusive structural reforms in labour markets, had been met.

Meanwhile, the book argues, the monetary union of the core Euro states should be strengthened, with steps towards full banking union and the ECB to act as a classic lender of last resort in future crises, an independent fiscal monitoring body, and a European Sovereign Bankruptcy Court. The authors would also ban certain derivatives transactions including the ‘Tobashi swaps’ used to hide the scale of Greek and Italian sovereign debt (widely sold, the book reports, by Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Nomura…..).

As for the ‘reset’ option, this would require temporary departure for the Eurozone and devaluation before joining a crawling peg against the Euro, a haircut on sovereign debt, monitoring of fiscal policy by an independent body, and increased reserve and capital requirements for domestic banks, as well as economic reform.

Reading about such details always makes me feel about as well-informed about the Euro crisis as I am about Schleswig-Holstein. The one thing that’s perfectly clear to me is that the peripheral countries will need to default in some form, as their debt burdens are unsustainable. Others who are more expert than I am will be better placed to evaluate the specific proposals in this book. It does all seem entirely level-headed, but one has to wonder about the political feasibility of sensible reforms.

The Assumptions Economists Make

On my journeys to and from The Hague this week (one of the joys of travel – offline time when nobody can email, phone me or ask me what’s for dinner), I read Jonathan Schlefer’s enjoyable [amazon_link id=”0674052269″ target=”_blank” ]The Assumptions Economists Make[/amazon_link]. It’s a book of two halves: a combination of a critique of modern economic methodology in general and a polemic against actually existing neoclassical economics in particular. The former, the first half, is much stronger, although the latter is probably more populist. The two halves will also appeal to different audiences – to professional economists and other social scientists in the first case, and to more general readers who are inclined to blame economics for the mess we’re in in the second.

The author is a political scientist and writer who undertook the commendable task of learning economics and reading widely before embarking on a critique. This distinguishes him from almost all other non-economist critics and in itself means economists must offer him equal respect and take this book seriously. The book starts with a very clear description of general equilibrium theory and the microfoundations built on it. Schlefer makes some extremely interesting points about the theory, drawing on the literature – as he notes, there is a “breach between the subtle world of proper neoclassical theory, which faces quandaries head on, and the corrupt world of neoclassical practice, which just ignores those quandaries.” (p89) One point, for example, is why a stable equilibrium cannot exist in the imaginary general equilibrium economy. All students of economics learn about the impossibility theorem – and then motor on with the rest of their studies as if it were not true. Similar points have been made elsewhere, such as Steve Keen’s [amazon_link id=”1848139926″ target=”_blank” ]Debunking Economics[/amazon_link], but I found it to be much clearer in [amazon_link id=”0674052269″ target=”_blank” ]The Assumptions Economists Make[/amazon_link].

The first chapters set out the basics of economic theory through a history of thought progression from Adam Smith to the marginalists – Jevons stands out here – along with Walras and Menger –  as the driving force in turning economics into a purely deductive science concerned with (in his words) ‘the mechanics of self-interest and utility’. (p76) (I wanted to know more about Jevons, especially having seeing his Logic Machine (below) in a Science Museum exhibition.)

Jevons’ Logic Machine (‘The machine is capable of replacing for the most part the action of thought required in the performance of logical deduction’.)

The book then turns to the consequent flaws in basic microeconomics, especially the concept of the production function and the assumption of marginalism and competition in investment. It revisits the ‘Two Cambridges’ debate (which I was taught about in graduate school, but with the neoclassical side the unquestioned victor in the version I learned), and goes on to question the logical coherence of aggregation in the way it’s done in conventional macroeconomics. Well, I’m with that idea wholeheartedly; my own journey from macroeconomics to micro started with a PhD thesis that confronted macro labour market models with industry-level data, a very effective way of lifting the rock of aggregation to reveal the nasty creepy-crawlies underneath.

However, after that, the book becomes less compelling for me. Schlefer spends the remaining chapters discussion Keynesianism as the master intended it and as his neoclassical interpreters shaped it in the post-war years. This is well-written, and I enjoyed discovering, for example, that Paul Samuelson was almost regarded as a dangerous Commie for taking Keynes seriously, so paranoid was early Cold War America (p192). However, a turn to a discussion of macroeconomic aggregates not what I wanted to read as a follow-on to a persuasive argument about why macroeconomic aggregates are problematic. Schlefer, like Keen in his book, attacks the conventional three-equation DSGE models – quite right too – but seems to want to replace it with an alternative abstract macro framework. Keen’s is a Minsky-esque version of disequilbrium dynamics. Schlefer’s is a structuralist approach following his teachers, especially Lance Taylor. (No doubt he would approve of Justin Yifu Lin’s [amazon_link id=”0691155895″ target=”_blank” ]The Quest for Prosperity[/amazon_link], setting out a ‘new structural economics’, although he doesn’t cite it.) He also mentions favourably ecological models.

He writes: “It is legitimate to impose informed assumptions on macro data – profits, wages, consumption, investment and the rest – in order to build rough macroeconomic models of cause and effect. The role of models is to be sure that assumptions are consistent, to understand their implications as well as possible, and to frame a coherent view that you can compare with historical experience.”  (p267) The huge mistake in modern macro, he says, was introducing the illusory quest for ‘microfoundations’. I suppose it’s correct to say an assumed macro framework is necessary, but this leaves me with a question not answered here, which is how on earth we should choose between them. Schlefer obviously likes the look of ecological predator-prey models. Other critics of macroeconomics prefer agent-based modelling, or econo-physics-style empirical exploration of datasets to derive regularities. Steve Keen has his own Keynes-Minsky set of abstractions. Many mainstream macroeconomists are insistent on the relevance of New-Keynesian DSGE models with stickiness in wages and prices, and some finance added in, post-crisis. [amazon_link id=”0674052269″ target=”_blank” ]The Assumptions Economists Make[/amazon_link] raises important questions but doesn’t answer the one raised half way through the book: “Is macroeconomics possible? There are serious doubts.”

[amazon_image id=”0674052269″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Assumptions Economists Make[/amazon_image]

All the economics books I want for Christmas….

It’s December 1st and time for letters to Santa. My reading for this blog through 2012 has been mildly random, a mixture of books I buy out of interest, and books sent by a range of publishers that were tantalising enough to start reading. The Enlightened Economist Prize for 2012 picked out the best of those (the winner was [amazon_link id=”1906924775″ target=”_blank” ]Economic Fables[/amazon_link] by Ariel Rubinstein). But there are lots of books I haven’t yet read and know I want to, thanks to a combination of inertia and waiting for paperback editions. Just in case Santa is a reader of this blog, here’s my list:

[amazon_link id=”1841154555″ target=”_blank” ]Grand Pursuit [/amazon_link]by Sylvia Nasar

[amazon_image id=”1841154555″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Grand Pursuit: A Story of Economic Genius: Great 20th Century Economic Thinkers and What They Discovered About the Way the World Works[/amazon_image]

[amazon_link id=”1846142520″ target=”_blank” ]Plutocrats[/amazon_link] by Chrystia Freedland

[amazon_link id=”0713998687″ target=”_blank” ]Iron Curtain[/amazon_link] by Anne Applebaum

[amazon_image id=”0713998687″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-56[/amazon_image]

[amazon_link id=”019992290X” target=”_blank” ]Misunderstanding Financial Crises[/amazon_link] by Gary Gorton

[amazon_link id=”0713996838″ target=”_blank” ]Governing the World[/amazon_link] by Mark Mazower

[amazon_image id=”0713996838″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Governing the World: The History of an Idea (Allen Lane History)[/amazon_image]

[amazon_link id=”0434017426″ target=”_blank” ]Thinking the 20th Century[/amazon_link] by Tony Judt

[amazon_link id=”125001395X” target=”_blank” ]The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade[/amazon_link] by Andrew Feinstein

[amazon_link id=”1846147522″ target=”_blank” ]The Signal and the Noise[/amazon_link] by Nate Silver

[amazon_link id=”1599869942″ target=”_blank” ]My Inventions[/amazon_link] by Nicola Tesla

[amazon_link id=”1844678571″ target=”_blank” ]A New Kind of Bleak[/amazon_link] by Owen Hatherley

[amazon_image id=”1844678571″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]A New Kind of Bleak: Journeys Through Urban Britain[/amazon_image]

[amazon_link id=”0465024424″ target=”_blank” ]Consent of the Networked[/amazon_link] by Rebecca McKinnon

Technology, people and place

Diego Comin, Mikhail Dmitriev, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg have written a fascinating summary of their work on the diffusion of technology, published as a CEPR working paper. The headline is that distance matters, and that the diffusion process follows the same kind of pattern seen in the transmission of epidemics.

The authors note that their data (covering a large number of technologies) strongly confirms the  pattern of east-to-west diffusion of technology described by Jared Diamond in his fantastic book [amazon_link id=”0099302780″ target=”_blank” ]Guns, Germs and Steel[/amazon_link]. The argument there was that geographical latitude explained the success of certain important agricultural innovations. So how could it also matter for the spread of, say, ATMs, cellphones or TVs? “Distance is a significantly more important impediment across parallels than across meridians.” The VoxEU authors suggest this is because technologies are spread – like diseases – by people, and the patterns of social contact for reasons of history and geography are more prevalent east-to-west than north-to-south.

[amazon_image id=”0099302780″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Guns, Germs and Steel: A short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years[/amazon_image]

There is a forward-looking aspect to this, of course. Trends in the movement of people do change over time, and have changed with globalisation. More significant, anybody thinking about long-term growth needs to think about the adoption of ideas. Most new ideas will come from outside the borders of one country, attached to people from elsewhere. One cannot think about innovation (among other things) without thinking about immigration – as Ian Goldin, Geoffrey Cameron and Meera Balarajan argued in their book [amazon_link id=”069115631X” target=”_blank” ]Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future[/amazon_link].

[amazon_image id=”069115631X” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future[/amazon_image]

Culture in austere times

In the evenings I’m still reading Dominic Sandbrook’s [amazon_link id=”0141032154″ target=”_blank” ]State of Emergency: Britain 1970-74[/amazon_link], a book too big to carry around on the tube (although I’d never read it on an e-reader). A passage about the resurgence in high culture against the background of an ailing economy and bitter strikes struck a chord. Sandbrook quotes David Lodge in 1971 saying there was “unprecedented cultural pluralism which allows, in all the arts, an astonishing variety of styles to flourish simultaneously.” It was a rich era for British fiction, for blockbuster exhibitions like the Tutankhamun show at the British Museum (I queued for hours as a schoolgirl to get into that), or Turner and Constable at the Tate. In classical music, the 70s brought operas by Benjamin Britten, Michael Tippett was at his peak, Harrison Birtwistle and Peter Maxwell Davies came to prominence. The Observer in 1975 commented on the mass enthusiasm for “sales of LPs, prints and paperbacks; the viewing statistics for opera, ballet and drama on television.” It added that there was a surge too in amateur dramatics, Sunday painting, community arts centres and other indicators of eagerness to participate.

[amazon_image id=”1846140315″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]State of Emergency: The Way We Were: Britain, 1970-1974[/amazon_image]

The chord this struck was with an excellent book about the 1930s, Richard Overy’s [amazon_link id=”0141003251″ target=”_blank” ]The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilisation 1919-39[/amazon_link]. He too made the link between economic upheaval and huge enthusiasm for seriousness in the arts and books. Overy highlighted, for example,  the astonishing popular success of the Left Book Club, and political and literary publications.

[amazon_image id=”0141003251″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilisation, 1919 – 1939[/amazon_image]

Are we experiencing the same kind of phenomenon now? One aspect that stands out for me personally is the growth of huge audiences for modern dance and classical ballet – I’ve been attending performances for years, and while these were considered challenging, minority interests 20 years ago, they’re tremendously popular now. Another is the passion so many people have for serious debate – lectures and debates are packed. The Festival of Economics at the weekend was one manifestation of it. There is certainly an appetite to understand what’s happening in the world.

So, another parallel between the 1930s, the 1970s and the 2010s: a cultural revival in austere times?