Reforming finance and corporate governance have been a bit of a theme in my recent reading. There was John Kay’s outstanding , which I reviewed here a few days ago. I’ve read the proof copy of Adair Turner’s impressive new book, , although am not allowed to post a review until it’s out in November.
[amazon_image id=”1781254435″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Other People’s Money: Masters of the Universe or Servants of the People?[/amazon_image] [amazon_image id=”0691169640″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance[/amazon_image]
Meanwhile, I’ve read a short new book by Laurie Fitzjohn-Sykes, formerly a City analyst and now working for the think tank Tomorrow’s Company. It’s called , and is well worth a read.
[amazon_image id=”1845408349″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Playing the Long Game: How to Save the West from Short-Termism (Societas)[/amazon_image]
The book starts with a vignette of the annual general meeting of Softbank in Japan, in which Masayashi Son gave a 2 hour speech setting out his 30 year and 300 year vision. He must be doing something right. Softbank’s latest product, Pepper the companion robot, has sold out its first two batches of 1000 within a minute of launch.
The author contrasts this of course with the quarterly results obsession in UK and US business, with the under-investment in the west compared with Asia, and stockmarket churn. It touches on one issue I think is highly damaging, the link between executive remuneration and share prices – as does Andrew Smithers in his excellent book .
[amazon_image id=”B00EMVHKR4″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Road to Recovery: How and Why Economic Policy Must Change[/amazon_image]
Fitzjohn-Sykes’ conclusions focus on exactly the need to change management incentives through corporate governance reform and taxation of the damaging pay structures. He also recommends using the tax system to link fund managers’ pay to the long term performance of their funds rather than quarterly outperformance, and introducing minimum stock holding periods for pension funds. In such a short book these recommendations are short on detail but surely in the right territory. Interestingly, he advocates requiring all market research to be conducted by 3rd parties – this focus on the problem of sell-side research is worth considering, along with putting the spotlight on the fund management industry as well as the investment banks and the companies themselves.
At 115 pages, this book is a concise introduction to the short-termism problem, and I’m sure some of the solutions it advocates will prove necessary. However, the problem is well-known and many people have suggested reforms; the question remains why they have so little political traction?